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I. INTRODUCTION
“I can tell you the day you see a camera come into our 
courtroom, it’s going to roll over my dead body.”2
-Justice David H. Souter
“Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for a redress of griev-
ances.”3
-U.S. Const. amend. I
“If [the glove] doesn’t fit, you must acquit”4
-Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr.
Defense attorney Johnnie Cochran’s statement be-came a key slogan of the O.J. Simpson trial, and its impact reached far beyond the jury box. Due largely to public fascination, the trial transformed 
from a standard criminal case to a courtroom drama. Triggered 
both by the unique circumstances of the case, such as the defen-
dant’s celebrity status and the fact 
pattern of the murder, and by the 
courtroom camera, which unques-
tionably enabled the public’s fasci-
nation, the story was made-for-T.V. 
from the beginning. Ninety-five 
million people watched on televi-
sion as O.J. Simpson led police of-
ficers on a high-speed chase down 
the Los Angeles freeways in 1994.5 
After the former football player was 
charged with the murder of his ex-
wife Nicole Brown Simpson and her friend Ronald Goldman, 
seventeen million people watched the second day of Simpson’s 
preliminary hearing.6 For nine months, the nation tuned in every 
day to watch the daytime saga that unfolded in the courtroom.7 
While Simpson was ultimately acquitted, the trial proceedings 
were of great importance in establishing precedent regarding 
the presence of media cameras in the courtroom. After much 
debate, Judge Lance A. Ito ruled that a single television camera 
could remain in his courtroom.8 Should Judge Ito have pulled 
the plug instead?
This Note will address precisely the conflict with which 
Judge Ito wrestled and use the lessons of his courtroom to fur-
ther analyze the issue of camera access at the Supreme Court 
level. The debate regarding freedom of press and access to fair 
trials is more relevant than ever because of the public’s grow-
ing interest in high-profile trials, the dedication of the media in 
covering them, and the proliferation of television and Internet as 
sources of judicial news. This last factor is especially significant 
because most members of the public can neither attend the tri-
als in person nor take the time to read Supreme Court opinions. 
People also may not have time to watch an entire trial, depend-
ing on video clips shown on television or the Internet. Granting 
cameras access to the courtrooms helps the public to have a 
greater understanding of the judicial system and the legal is-
sues involved in a case.9 Furthermore, technological innovations 
have made news equipment far less intrusive and thus barely 
noticeable, to courtroom participants.
The judge’s main motivation in issuing an order restrict-
ing press coverage is to ensure and protect a criminal defen-
dant’s constitutional right to a fair 
trial. The Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution says, 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial . . . .”10 The 
right to a “public trial” does not 
mean, however, that criminal trials 
must be accessible to anyone who 
wants to watch from their homes. In 
other words, that specific “right” is 
not absolute.
The accused’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury 
must be balanced with the First Amendment rights of the press 
and public.11 The primary concern is that legally inadmissible 
information made available by the press may contaminate the 
jury pool, leading to the possibility of jurors deciding a case 
based on improper evidence.12 Also, some worry that prosecu-
tors and defense attorneys, hoping to get more attention about 
their case or to rally public support, would further dramatize 
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the case.13 Will a televised case turn into an episode of Law and 
Order? However, if the public only watched the televised court 
proceedings of celebrities or public officials and sought only 
the most sensational parts of the coverage, would they not still 
be learning about the crime, its potential penalties, and judicial 
procedure? If cameras are banned from criminal proceedings, 
are we not missing out on an opportunity to educate the public?
To address these questions, this Note will present the rele-
vant case history regarding press coverage of the administration 
of justice. It will explain how cases, such as Estes v. Texas,14 
Chandler v. Florida,15 Sheppard v. Maxwell,16 Richmond News-
papers Inc. v. Virginia,17 and Nebraska Press Association v. 
Stuart,18 have negotiated the rough terrain between the public’s 
right to know and the desire to protect the integrity of trial. 
Earlier cases addressed print journalism, since television news 
technology has only been widely used during the second half 
of the twentieth century.19 The lessons learned from cases in-
volving print journalism, however, inform both past and future 
policies regarding broadcast press access.
In addition, this Note will provide the history of regula-
tions involving camera access to the courts. In response to 
early excessive media coverage, the American Bar Association 
(A.B.A.) drafted Canon 35 in support of curtailing camera ac-
cess to the courts. The Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 
53 followed suit, applying the recommendation to the federal 
court system. This Note will call attention to such statutes as 
California Rule 1.150 (formerly California Rule 980), which 
regulates “photographing, recording, and broadcasting in [state] 
court,”20 in addition to other proposed bills that would lead to 
greater camera access to trials. Among these are the “Sunshine 
in the Courtroom” bill (Sunshine Bill), which would allow 
federal judges to permit video cameras in the courtroom,21 and 
Senator Arlen Specter’s bill, which aims to get a camera into 
the nation’s highest court.22 Finally, this Note will conclude that 
the Supreme Court should to change its “no cameras allowed” 
policy and to enable a television camera and microphone to 
serve as much a part of courtroom coverage as a pen and paper.
II. A SNAPSHOT OF TELEVISION NEWS  
CAMERA REGULATION
An early source of courtroom camera regulations arose as a 
result of the extensive media attention during the trial of Bruno 
Richard Hauptmann. Hauptmann was accused of kidnapping 
and murdering the son of Charles Lindbergh, the first person 
to make a transatlantic flight.23 Although the judge imposed 
restrictions on film camera use in the courtroom, the trial dem-
onstrated that the issue of courtroom cameras could no longer 
be ignored.24 In 1937, the A.B.A. recommended in Canon 35 to 
forbid courtroom radio broadcasting, televising, or photograph-
ing, but Canon 35 was not binding on courts.25 Following the 
A.B.A.’s recommendation, however, Congress enacted the Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure’s Rule 53, which states, “[t]he 
taking of photographs in the courtroom during the progress of 
judicial proceedings . . . shall not be permitted.”26 This prohibits 
all audio or visual recording of federal criminal cases, even if 
the defendant requests a televised trial.27
Whether television coverage is allowed depends on the ju-
risdiction. In civil cases, each U.S. court of appeals can decide 
whether to allow broadcasting of appellate arguments.28 In state 
superior courts, judges have the power to decide on a case-by-
case basis whether to allow television coverage of courtroom 
proceedings.29 In the federal district courts, however, there is 
a general policy of prohibiting broadcast coverage.30 Federal 
appellate court judges can decide whether to televise their court 
proceedings.31 In recent years, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has allowed “[television] coverage of some high-profile 
appeals.”32 Then in December 2009, the Ninth Circuit took a 
further step by announcing that it would “experiment with a 
‘limited use’ of cameras in its trial courts.”33
In 2005, Iowa Republican Senator Chuck Grassley and 
New York Democratic Senator Charles Schumer introduced the 
“Sunshine in the Courtroom” bill. This bill would give federal 
judges the option of allowing cameras in the courtrooms and 
would promote greater public access to the courtrooms, thus 
“ensur[ing] the sun shines in on the federal courts.”34 A particu-
larly helpful feature of this bill is that it offers guidelines for 
judges to refer to in deciding whether to permit video camera 
access in their court.35 It also instructs the Judicial Conference, 
the policymaking branch of the federal courts, to “issue man-
datory guidelines for obscuring vulnerable witnesses such as 
undercover officers, victims of crime, and their families.”36 Yet 
even if this bill becomes law, the mandate would not be perma-
nent; the “Sunshine Bill” includes a sunset clause calling for 
its automatic expiration after three years.37 As of April 2010, 
the bill was still awaiting consideration by the full U.S. Senate 
and had yet to take effect.38 While this bill is a step in the right 
direction, as it does not require a judge in federal court to allow 
camera access during judicial proceedings, this step could also 
be largely illusory. Since a judge has wide discretion in this 
matter, it is unnecessary for him or her to specify a reason for 
prohibiting camera access; this is truly a matter of the judge’s 
personal preference. However, forty-eight states currently allow 
for some method of audio-visual coverage in their courtrooms, 
and almost forty states directly televise trials.39  Grassley has 
stated that studies conducted in many of the states that televise 
trials confirm that televised trial coverage educates the public 
about the courts and does not interfere with proceedings.40
If the “Sunshine Bill” becomes law, it may look similar to 
California Rule 1.150, which permits the judge to allow televi-
sion, radio, and photographic coverage in the courtroom.41 In 
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deciding whether to allow camera coverage, the California Rule 
1.150 lists nineteen different factors for judges to consider.42 
These factors include the type of case, whether the parties sup-
port the request, the degree of difficulty in selecting a jury, and 
the effect on any minor who is a party, witness, or victim.43 
Under the rule, the judge must prohibit media coverage of the 
following: “(1) Proceedings held in chambers; (2) Proceedings 
closed to the public; (3) Jury selection; (4) Jurors or spectators; 
or (5) Conferences between an attorney and a client, witness, 
or aide; between attorneys; or between counsel and the judge 
at the bench.”44
Perhaps the most troubling of all courtroom camera restric-
tions is that to this day the Supreme 
Court still does not allow camera 
access in its courtroom. Greta Van 
Susteren,45 who appeared regularly 
on television as a legal analyst dur-
ing the O.J. Simpson trial, called 
the lack of camera coverage in the 
Supreme Court “dangerous.”46 She 
was especially frustrated that the 
Supreme Court determines critical 
issues but also operates without the 
public’s scrutiny; “[s]ome people 
get really mad about taxes or traf-
fic or food additives . . . But there 
is nothing that gets my blood boil-
ing more than the fact that there is 
a group of people in this country 
whose decisions affect our lives and 
who get to do their work in secret.”47 To better examine this 
issue, it may be helpful to consider the Supreme Court’s analy-
sis in cases that have strong arguments both for and against 
media access to trials.
III. CAMERA SHY: LESSONS FROM CASE LAW 
INVOLVING CAMERAS IN THE COURT
The Supreme Court in Estes v. Texas recognized the influ-
ence of courtroom cameras by holding that the use of such cam-
eras may distort a criminal trial to such an extent that the only 
remedy is a reversal of the defendant’s conviction.48 Defendant, 
Billy Sol Estes, was accused of swindling after essentially dup-
ing farmers into buying farm equipment that never existed.49 
His pretrial hearing to determine whether to admit television 
cameras was covered live on television and radio.50 The Court 
said that the use of television cameras deprived a defendant of 
due process as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment, even if it 
did not provoke specific prejudice against the accused.51 In ad-
dition to encouraging public condemnation of the accused, the 
Court ruled that coverage of an already sensational trial created 
too great a risk of influencing or distracting the judge, jurors, 
witnesses, and lawyers.52 Furthermore, the Court said that the 
presence of a camera, which it called a “powerful weapon,” de-
liberately damaged the defendant and subjected him to “a form 
of mental—if not physical—harassment, resembling a police 
line-up or the third degree.”53 The magnification of the defen-
dant’s movements further intensify the trial and “transgress his 
personal sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to concentrate 
on the proceedings before him—sometimes the difference be-
tween life and death . . . .”54
The Estes case was decided in 1965, at a time when cameras 
were quite large and when “twelve 
cameramen jostled for position, and 
bright lights and a tangle of wires 
and equipment turned the courtroom 
into a broadcast studio.”55 This ac-
tivity disrupted court proceedings. 
Yet the dissents in Estes are as 
noteworthy as the majority opinion 
on this note. Justice William Bren-
nan said that the decision “is not a 
blanket constitutional prohibition 
against the televising of state crimi-
nal trials,” but a prohibition against 
televising the most sensational 
ones, where the defendant is most 
susceptible to the community’s in-
terest and hence judgment.56 Justice 
Potter Stewart followed by stating 
that if the proceeding itself did not deprive the defendant of his 
right to a fair trial, “then the fact that the public could view the 
proceeding on television has no constitutional significance.”57 
This argument means that an image, duplicated via a camera’s 
broadcasts, did not automatically establish a constitutional vio-
lation. Instead, “[t]he Constitution does not make us arbiters 
of the image that a televised state criminal trial projects to the 
public.”58
Almost twenty years after Estes, the Supreme Court tack-
led another noteworthy case involving cameras in the courts. In 
Chandler v. Florida, the Court ruled that televising a criminal 
trial over the defendant’s objection did not automatically render 
the trial unfair.59 Before the case reached the Supreme Court, 
two Florida policemen were convicted of several crimes includ-
ing burglary. At the time Florida was running a pilot program 
where the courts allowed camera coverage in the courtroom, and 
the case went to trial during this time.60 Since the defendants had 
objected to televising the trial, the judge allowed taping only 
of the closing arguments and a segment of the prosecution’s 
presentation.61 The Chandler decision did not directly establish 
that there is a constitutional right to have cameras in the courts. 
Perhaps the most troubling 
of all courtroom camera 
restrictions is that to this 
day the Supreme Court 
still does not allow camera 
access in its courtroom.
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Yet the case is significant because although the court denied 
the defendants’ request not to televise the trial, the Supreme 
Court still upheld the defendants’ burglary conviction.62 For a 
court to decide that camera coverage led to prejudice against a 
defendant, the defendant had to show that the media’s cover-
age compromised the jury’s ability to decide the case fairly.63 
The defendants could not meet that burden with any identifiable 
evidence in this case.
The Supreme Court Justices relied in part on the changes 
in technology following Estes; television coverage was no lon-
ger a burdensome physical imposition, as large cameras, bright 
lights, and heavy cables were a thing of the past. Moreover, 
during jury selection each juror said that they would be “fair and 
impartial despite the presence of a television [news] camera in 
the courtroom.”64 Further, “[t]he risk of juror prejudice in some 
cases does not justify an absolute ban on news coverage of tri-
als by the printed media; so such also the risk of such prejudice 
does not warrant an absolute constitutional ban on all broadcast 
coverage.”65 Instead of directly overturning the previous ruling, 
the Supreme Court said it was reading Estes more narrowly, so 
that the holding would only apply to cases of widespread inter-
est.66 Many states interpreted Chandler as an implicit message 
of support for televising trials.67
A. TRIAL PUBLICITY AND AN IMPARTIAL JURY
In Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Supreme Court discussed the 
circumstances in which media coverage would be so pervasive 
as to damage a defendant’s due process rights, such that public 
access to proceedings should be limited.68 Due process requires 
that one accused of a crime be judged by an “impartial jury” 
that is not affected by any “outside influences.”69 This case at-
tracted much publicity because it involved a doctor who was 
charged with murdering his pregnant wife, and was described 
as a case involving “murder and mystery, society, sex and sus-
pense.”70 Numerous newspaper articles were published convict-
ing Sheppard in the court of public opinion; “The newspapers 
portrayed Sheppard as a Lothario, fully explored his relation-
ship with Susan Hayes, and named a number of other women 
who were allegedly involved with him. The testimony at trial 
never showed that Sheppard had any illicit relationships besides 
the one with Susan Hayes.”71  Based on the “carnival”72 atmo-
sphere that ensued inside the courtroom, the Court overturned 
Sheppard’s conviction and remanded for retrial.
The Court outlined several steps that trial courts could use 
to provide a fair trial in a highly publicized case. For example, 
it was suggested that the judge tell all police, witnesses, and at-
torneys not to disclose information to the media that jurors are 
not allowed to discover.73 Much of the information released was 
inaccurate and confusing, and affected the jurors’ perception of 
the defendant. Specifically, the prosecutors shared information 
with the media that they were not allowed to present at trial.74 
In doing so, they circumvented the rules of evidence, which are 
designed to enhance the reliability of information presented to 
the jurors. The Supreme Court suggested that given the exten-
sive pretrial publicity, the trial court should have been on notice 
that the proceedings could go awry and should have considered 
sequestering the jurors or moving the trial to an alternate loca-
tion.75 Although the case did not specifically focus on televi-
sion news coverage of trials, but rather the danger of excessive 
media publicity, it did bolster those who were against cameras 
in the court.76
B. EXCLUSION OF THE PRESS
So far, courts have not supported the idea that there is a 
First Amendment right to televise a trial. In Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Virginia, there were several mistrials in a mur-
der case.77 As a result, the defendant’s attorneys asked that the 
trial be closed to the public and the media, and the prosecution 
did not object.78 The trial judge closed the proceedings to the 
public and the media, but two reporters from Richmond News-
papers, Inc. claimed that doing so violated the First and Sixth 
Amendments.79 They argued that “[t]o work effectively, it is 
important that society’s criminal process ‘satisfy the appear-
ance of justice,’ . . . [which] can best be provided by allowing 
people to observe such process.”80 The Supreme Court said that 
in the enumerated constitutional guarantees, there are also “cer-
tain unarticulated rights” which are tools for exercising those 
rights that are spelled out.81 The right to attend criminal trials, 
the Court held, is not explicitly stated in the First Amendment 
but was implicitly guaranteed.82 The Court held that the freedom 
of speech clause of First Amendment not only protected the 
right to speak, but also the right to ”receive information and 
ideas.”83 The other First Amendment guarantee the Court dis-
cussed was the right of assembly, which is necessary for meet-
ing the freedom of speech prong of the First Amendment. The 
right of assembly is protected for a public place, such as a trial 
court room, “where the people generally—and representatives 
of the media—have a right to be present, and where their pres-
ence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and 
quality of what takes place.”84
C. INCRIMINATING INFORMATION
In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, a trial judge 
ordered reporters to refrain from publishing incriminating 
information about the defendant, including accounts of his con-
fession.85 Erwin Charles Simants was charged with killing six 
people, the Henry Kellie family, in a rural Nebraska commu-
nity.86 The court order was designed to protect the defendant 
from the disclosure of information that could be extremely prej-
udicial.87 The Supreme Court invalidated this order, relying in 
part on past case law that places a high burden on the party mov-
ing for a restraint of media coverage.88 Just as criminal or civil 
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punishments of a newspaper’s publishing of a story “chills” free 
speech, “prior restraint ‘freezes’ it at least for the time.”89 The 
Court looked at several factors in analyzing the validity of these 
restrictions—first, the pervasiveness of pretrial news coverage 
because it can provide a preview of what actual trial coverage 
will look like; second, whether less drastic measures could miti-
gate the publicity’s effects, so that a minimal level of camera 
access could be allowed in a way that protects the defendant’s 
rights; and third, to what degree an order that restricts the press 
would be effective in directly minimizing any danger that a trial 
poses when it receives a huge amount of trial publicity.90 The 
Court accepted the trial judge’s finding that the pretrial public-
ity was intense and pervasive.91 However, the Court found no 
basis for concluding that the less restrictive measure of allowing 
camera access in the courtroom could not guarantee a fair trial.92 
The Court also doubted that the restraining order itself would be 
effective in guaranteeing a fair trial, noting that the order would 
be difficult to police, that media beyond the court’s jurisdiction 
might publish prejudicial information, and that rumors in the 
small community would travel “swiftly by word of mouth.”93
IV. ANALYSIS: CANDID CAMERA: HOW TO RESOLVE 
THE ISSUE OF TRIAL BY SOUNDBITE
“We are not part of a national entertainment net-
work.”94
-Justice Anthony Kennedy
The Supreme Court has overruled its previous decisions on 
a wide variety of cases, but there is one precedent that seems al-
ways to hold firm—no televising of its proceedings. Ironically, 
even in cases where the Supreme Court rules that televising 
trials in other courts is constitutionally permissible, the Court 
has not allowed their proceedings in making those decisions to 
be televised.95
A. DOWNSIDE TO CAMERAS IN THE COURTS
The concern with this issue is whether media coverage 
could allow a jury pool to be contaminated by information that 
would be inadmissible in the courtroom, thus allowing them to 
decide against the defendant not on proper evidence, but rather 
on prejudicial information reported by the press. For instance, 
information inadmissible in court and substantially prejudicial to 
the defendant includes legally irrelevant information about the 
defendant’s life, such as if he was unfaithful to his spouse. Other 
potentially prejudicial information includes reporting whether 
the defendant has had previous criminal convictions, discuss-
ing a confession where there is a chance it was not obtained 
by legal means and describing evidence that police obtained 
during an illegal search. The risks of televising trials could also 
increase the potential of the viewers’ heightened condemnation 
of the accused so that if the defendant were acquitted, he may 
have difficulty integrating back into society. Moreover, there is 
also the concern that the presence of television cameras could 
intimidate witnesses thus making them less willing to testify.96
In responding to the argument that broadcasting judicial 
proceedings would enhance the judicial system’s esteem in the 
eyes of the public, Judge Ito stated that broadcasting Congres-
sional hearings had not helped enhance Congress’s approval rat-
ing among viewers.97 Moreover, the Judge was concerned that 
small portions of testimony might be taken out of context and 
broadcasted for its dramatic flair.98 Several others shared this 
concern. Supreme Court Justice Souter’s “over my dead body” 
quote referenced the fact that while he was Associate Justice 
of the New Hampshire Superior Court, the presence of a cam-
era limited the questions he would ask because he was worried 
about his statements being “taken out of context on the evening 
news.”99 It is true that no judge wants to be second-guessed. 
If the public can watch someone performing their job, there is 
thus more of an opportunity for them to also critique it. But the 
opposite is also true; even if the public generally disagrees with 
a court’s decision, the public might accept the ruling as fair be-
cause they have heard the arguments of each side along the way. 
In addition to “trial by sound bite,” Judge Ito was worried that 
a televised trial would lead to “nervous witnesses” and “grand-
standing lawyers.”100 He was further concerned that television 
coverage would only pick out the “most salacious sound bites” 
and would encourage lawyers to play to the camera and not to 
justice.101 Other arguments include that which holds the televis-
ing of a trial would violate “decorum” and “intimidate witnesses 
and jurors.”102
Further, there is the chance of “media overkill.”103 If televi-
sion networks cover a trial and ratings are high, the media may 
cover the story in too much detail, even when there is nothing 
new to report. The endless supply of useless details about the 
case could cause viewers to become bored with its minutiae 
and tune out from courtroom coverage altogether. In the O.J. 
Simpson case the media coverage was incessant, to the point 
that one poll “showed 74% of Americans could identify Kato 
Kaelin but only 25% knew who Vice President was.”104 If peo-
ple rely on television news as their source of information, and 
the networks are running coverage only of a case they know 
will draw ratings, there is other valuable information that this 
coverage is displacing. Arguably, it is not worth jeopardizing 
the criminal procedure protections of the Sixth Amendment for 
the First Amendment because the trials provide little societal 
value. In fact, when the freedom of the press allows the media 
to sensationalize a trial, people obsess about celebrity trials at 
the expense of engaging other valuable news.
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B. BENEFITS TO HAVING A CAMERA IN THE  
 SUPREME COURT
In the Supreme Court, there are neither jurors nor wit-
nesses. Yet in thousands of courts across the country, judges 
are able to control the proceedings despite the presence of a 
camera.105 Clara Tuma, a truTV news anchor, stated that while 
initially cameras can be distracting to jurors, they quickly adjust 
to the presence of the cameras:
What we find time and time again is that a camera is 
a novelty for the first moment or so. Jurors look at it. 
Attorneys want to know what it will show and if their 
bald spot will show. Judges are frequently concerned 
whether their nameplates are visible. Those are cos-
metic things and you get over them. The participants 
quickly get to the business at hand and that is the busi-
ness of a trial. The camera becomes invisible and is 
quickly forgotten by the participants.106
As a television reporter covering the courts, I had firsthand 
experience delivering stories directly to the camera, which in 
reality, is communicating with viewers. The jury is composed 
of the same people who watch the news; i.e., members of the 
general public. In televising trials, these same people, now as 
jurors, are still making decisions 
about the case and are present in the 
courtroom anyway. The greater risk 
of contaminating the jury is grand-
standing, which may occur regard-
less of the presence of a camera.
In the O.J. Simpson case, 
“given the public’s right to attend 
court proceedings and the paucity 
of seats in the courtroom—9 to 15 
spots are set aside for the public—
television coverage represented the 
only alternative to holding court 
in the Los Angeles Coliseum.”107 
In fact, “[o]ne study estimated that 
U.S. industry lost more than $25 bil-
lion as workers turned away from 
their jobs to follow the trial.”108 
Both sides also felt that allowing 
cameras in the court would help 
to legitimize the verdict. When Ito 
ruled in favor of the television cam-
era in court, his position was sum-
marized as follows: “[R]ather than 
encourage irresponsible reporting, cameras could both check 
and correct it, and that in a case crucial to public faith in courts, 
television was essential.”109
This issue came to the forefront during the 2000 presiden-
tial election. The Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore110 decided 
whether to continue recounting the ballots in Florida, a deci-
sion which would potentially determine the next president of 
the United States.111 C-SPAN Chairman Brian Lamb wrote to 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist requesting to broadcast the 
proceedings so that the public may have a greater acceptance 
of the Supreme Court’s ruling.112 However, Rehnquist denied 
his request, writing that “a majority of the Court remains of the 
view that we should adhere to our present practice of allowing 
public attendance and print media coverage of argument ses-
sions, but not allow camera or audio coverage.”113 However, 
the Court did allow the immediate release of an audiotape of the 
Bush v. Gore argument, whereas could the release of such tapes 
often took take several months.114 Justice Rehnquist’s statement 
left open the possibility that some Justices may have been sup-
portive of letting the cameras access the courtroom.115 Either 
way, the Supreme Court has seats for only 300 people.116 Once 
those spaces fill up, lawyers who are Supreme Court Bar mem-
bers “can listen to arguments over a speaker system in a nearby 
room.”117 As for anyone else who has an interest or stake in the 
case, they are out of luck. Broadcast news reporters can enter 
the courtroom, but in order to share the information with the 
public, they must rely on their notes and personal recollection 
of what happened, which is not the 
case with actual recordings.118
While the Court did provide 
an expedited transcript released on 
the day of argument, the transcript 
failed to identify which Justices 
were asking the questions.119 Hence, 
“[t]he court missed an opportunity 
when it failed to allow the millions 
following the case [outside the 
courtroom] to be eyewitnesses to 
history, instead of mere eavesdrop-
pers.”120 True, the public does have a 
constitutional right to attend a judi-
cial proceeding, but in practice such 
a right means very little when seat-
ing is limited and individuals do not 
have secondary viewership if televi-
sion cameras are not allowed.121 The 
Supreme Court does a disservice to 
the constitutional principles it seeks 
to uphold if it places barriers of the 
truthful reporting of matters of pub-
lic concern. At this point, when so many media consumers rely 
on television news for their source of information, merely re-
leasing printed transcripts is not a reasonable alternative.
True, the public does 
have a constitutional 
right to attend a judicial 
proceeding, but in practice 
such a right means very 
little when seating is  
limited and individuals 
do not have secondary 
viewership if television 
cameras are not allowed.
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At the Supreme Court level, there is no jury that needs to 
be sequestered. Surely no one expects the Justices to close their 
eyes and ears to nightly news reports. Given the Justices’ life-
time appointments, there is no reason for them to be concerned 
about being closely scrutinized. Furthermore, jurors for lower 
courts are told that observing a case firsthand and making a 
personal determination of its facts is a civic duty and promotes 
justice. However, if they would actually like to watch a case 
unfold at the nation’s highest court, they would have to travel 
to Washington, D.C. A case that is decided upon constitutional 
principles is an opportunity to educate the public and galvanize 
a vigorous public debate on issues of national importance.
V. PROPOSAL: “A TRIAL RUN” FOR PLACING A 
TELEVISION NEWS CAMERA IN THE SUPREME COURT
The day may come when television will have become 
so commonplace an affair in the daily life of the av-
erage person as to dissipate all reasonable likelihood 
that its use in courtrooms may disparage the judicial 
process.122
-Justice Harlan
That day has already arrived. Right now, the public gets 
most of their knowledge about the legal system from celebrity 
run-ins with the law, such as Paris Hilton or Winona Ryder, 
or from several especially heinous crimes that garner media 
attention, such as the trials for the Menendez Brothers and 
Scott Peterson. Other sources of information about the court 
include reality shows such as Judge Judy or television dramas 
such as Boston Legal and Law and Order. Instead of continu-
ing its courtroom ban on cameras and tape recorders, the Su-
preme Court should revise its policy, and the Court should be 
required to allow press coverage in the form of radio and televi-
sion broadcasts. Would the television coverage of the nation’s 
highest court turn the proceedings into a television drama? 
Television networks push the hardest to televise only the most 
sensational trials that often have limited significance, so would 
not allowing cameras in the courts merely elevate these less 
important cases and give them dignity that they do not deserve?
The other two branches of government, the executive and 
the legislative branches, both allow camera access; “[i]f you 
wish, you can watch Congress in session, debating issues, on 
C-Span. The President of the United States routinely gives 
televised press conferences and answers questions.”123 These 
branches do the public a great service when they allow for bet-
ter transparency. Supreme Court Justice confirmation hearings 
are televised. There appears to be no justification to forbid see-
ing the Justices at work. What justifies the Supreme Court from 
blocking such transparency? If cameras were to be allowed in 
the Supreme Court, then television news organizations could 
pool, or share, their footage, so that only one camera would 
need to be present. Not televising courtroom proceedings, some 
argue, “is like locking the courtroom door.”124
The “Sunshine in the Courtroom” bill should become law 
and be applied to the federal courts. In March 2006, the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee approved the bill, which would amend 
Chapter 45 of Title 28 of the United States Code.125 But the 
Supreme Court should go even further than required by the bill 
and California Rule 1.150. Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter 
sponsored a Senate bill that would allow television coverage of 
all Supreme Court open sessions, “as long as a majority vote of 
justices allows it or unless they rule that it would constitute a 
violation of due process rights of one or more parties.”126 It is 
important to emphasize that the bill would not allow the Jus-
tices’ deliberations to be televised, just the oral arguments. As 
much progress as this bill could make, it still would leave the 
ultimate decision about whether to televise proceedings to the 
Justices themselves. It builds in a safeguard to protect parties’ 
constitutional rights. This bill should be the model for the Su-
preme Court’s camera access policy. The Supreme Court, as a 
governmental entity, should not be in the business of telling the 
public what to watch. Of course, whether in state, federal, or 
the nation’s highest court, there may be exceptional reasons not 
to televise. An example where direct coverage would unduly 
burden the judicial branch would be a rape case, especially one 
involving a minor, because a victim especially may be discour-
aged to come forward. Also, coverage may be curtailed if there 
is a concern that stating a victim’s name may place them in 
harm’s way. In these cases, it would be legitimate to exclude 
televised coverage of court proceedings. In certain cases, indi-
vidual judges, or in the case of the Supreme Court, the aggregate 
of Justices, should be given discretion to make individualized 
decisions.127
As the Justices are appointed for life, they do not need to 
be concerned with the public’s approval rating, and therefore 
they should not be influenced by the public’s perception of their 
work. The trick is to navigate between two competing interests; 
an individual privacy interest would have to be weighed against 
publishing information that is of public importance. Simply put, 
“[t]here is a reason we do not hold trials in private and a reason 
we open the courtroom doors and invite in the world. The rea-
son is that justice shines brightest in the sunshine.”128 At mini-
mum, a presumption should be created that cameras are allowed 
in the Court. The burden of proof would fall upon the Court or 
the parties of a case to show that the presence of cameras would 
adversely affect the outcome.
There is some hope for progress in the movement in allow-
ing cameras in the Supreme Court. Justice Sonia Sotomayor re-
placed Justice Souter, who was extremely vocal against having 
Supreme Court proceedings televised. Justice Sotomayor was 
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careful not to directly say she would favor camera access, but 
during her confirmation hearings, she did state that she would 
be open to a dialogue: “I have had positive experiences with 
cameras when I have been asked to join experiments using cam-
eras in the courtroom.”129 We live in an era of blogs, podcasts, 
and TiVo. If the Court does not make some effort to coexist 
with trials’ television coverage, it will leave the education of the 
public about the court system to those who do. Writer Dahlia 
Lithwick, who covers the Supreme Court for Slate Magazine, 
posits that if the Justices want to maintain the Court’s prestige, 
it is in their best interest to televise its proceedings.130 She ar-
gues that new technology, specifically the Internet, makes it so 
easy for others to flood the web with satire and “updates” about 
the Supreme Court that it must use the television airwaves to 
reach out to the public and preserve its image.131
“People want to know what happens in the marble 
temple: If they aren’t allowed in to watch the real 
thing, they will enter via snarky anonymous blog. If 
the high court doesn’t make at least some concessions 
to the public, the American people will get to know 
its justices and their jobs through parody and politics 
alone.”132
In essence, not only would the public be missing out on the 
important details of a case, but also people who consult sources 
with incorrect information could be misinformed.
VI. CONCLUSION: “T.V. OR NOT T.V.?”133 
THAT IS THE QUESTION
In the O.J. Simpson trial, the ubiquitous presence of the 
television camera turned a criminal trial into a courtroom 
drama. Given the pervasiveness of cable news outlets, local, 
and national news shows, it seems that there is an opportunity to 
indulge the public’s fascination with celebrity trials and to teach 
some powerful lessons about crimes, civil wrongs, and how the 
judicial system functions. Presently, most states allow televi-
sion coverage of criminal and civil trials in superior courts. In 
California, for example, California Rule 1.150 (formerly Rule 
of Court 990) allows, but does not require, television, radio, 
and photo coverage.134 Federal courts have experimented with 
television coverage in certain courts but under very limited 
circumstances.
So far, courts have rejected the argument that the First 
Amendment gives the right to televise a trial. While legislators 
may have the ability to encourage federal courts to open their 
doors to the camera, they have not taken steps to do the same 
at the Supreme Court level. It is a direct blow to democracy to 
not allow the public to understand how the Justices interpret the 
Constitution in light of a specific set of facts. Television news 
equipment is no longer disruptive and can preserve the decorum 
of the nation’s highest court. Further, it can provide a window 
to its functions.
If a main concern is truth during a trial, it is best to not 
make it more difficult for those disseminating the facts, the re-
porters, to gather information. It behooves the public to allow 
the mild intrusiveness of a camera for the increased possibil-
ity of transparency and accountability of the courtroom. The 
public has more confidence in the judicial system when they 
see its processes step by step. Televising courtroom proceed-
ings also serves as a check in making sure the process ensures 
justice, because seeing the actual trial is the most direct way to 
see the judicial system function. It is a foolproof way to get the 
story right because the information is disseminated is its purest 
form—through the trial itself. CLB
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for or against granting permission to photograph, record, or broadcast 
court proceedings.” Id.
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